re: איסור תורה היינו לילך ולשמוע - i.e. the איסור תורה
is only if the
listener has intent to hear the LH. לענ"ד here the word ("היינו") is meant to introduce a
qualification of the איסור and
not a definition (explaining what the essence of what LH is) nor even one of the גדרים of specific to LH. As the CC explains in BMC14, there is a
general היתר (i.e. not specific or intrinsic to LH) which is applicable to "כל איסורין שבתורה" called "הנאה הבאה לאדם
בעל כרחו". What "איסור תורה היינו לילך ולשמוע" means is that the איסור תורה דשמיעת לשה"ר is subject to the היתר of "
בעל כרחו" if the listener wasn't לילך לשמוע - i.e. didn't go (to join the conversation) for the purpose of hearing LH. Without this, there isn't the requisite intention necessary to be liable for
any איסור שבתורה . (See
here whether that requires that the person was
unaware/caught by surprise by the LH or even if he was aware but the איסור was
incidental to his purpose for going.)
However, this is not to say that שיטת רבנו is that intent is NOT intrinsic to the definition of שמעית לשה"ר - only that he's not referencing that here. We find that the CC splits סיפור לשה"ר it
into 2 categories - one based on the potential impact of what was said and the other
based on the speaker's intent.
Either one is enough to make it אסור משום לשה"ר. The mere
possibility of "damage" suffices to prohibit the סיפור as LH regardless of the speaker's intention (e.g.
יהודה בן גרים). However, that is only one type of LH. The "חלק החמור" of LH is the speaker's choice (i.e. intent) "להרשיע את חביריו". Thus, סיפור לשה"ר
does depend on the speaker's intent (where there is no damage). LH4_1_1 explains how this can result in a heiter to speak
גנות ממש even w/o תועלת. You'll see there how the 2 parts are satisfied - (1) there is no possible embarrassment (actual "damage") that can
result in the end and (2) no
intention from the onset to embarrass.
Thus, if the CC
views שמיעה/קבלה as a mirror image of the איסור of סיפור לשה"ר (despite being learned from a different passuk) - intention should effect the איסור קבלה in the same way. In LH6_1, רבינו seems to explain the reason for the איסור קבלה is "כי עי"ז יבוזה בעינינו מי שנאמר עליו" (i.e. due to the damage caused). לכאורה, the חלק החמור would also apply (presumably) for the שמיעה -
merely for the intention of wanting to hear something that he views as גנות. However, in our case, that intention doesn't exist - as the CC explains. Nonetheless, even w/o the intention to hear LH, לכאורה is the damage aspect of LH also exists in the
שמיעה itself. Recall, re: the סיפור that merely creating the
possibility of harm is enough to make it LH. So too, re: שמיעה, once he hears it, it "instantly" creates the
possibility that it may result in him believing it and lowering his esteem of the נידון ("damage') and is LH - regardless of intent. Thus, it wouldn't seem likely that איסור תורה היינו לילך ולשמוע means to say that the עצם איסור שמיעה requires intent. Rather, the היתר is due to the
requisite intent component of איסורים in general. (i.e. the היתר דהנאה הבאה לאדם בע"כ).
This may also explain רבינו's seemingly peculiar stress on
immediacy (
BMC13) and the apparent prequisite condition (condtion no. 1) listed in the מקור החיים to have
complete conviction to not believe what you'll hear.
In addition, to the aforementioned איסור שמיעה for merely creating the possibility of harm, it would seem the opposite should also be true לקולא. The same היתר that the CC discusses in LH4_1_1 should apply to permit the שמיעה. Namely, if the person doesn't have intention to hear LH (לשם גנות) and (e.g. based on his view of the topic being discussed and opinion of the נידון) knows for certain that hearing it won't lower his esteem of the נידון (thus no damage). This is only regarding LH, other איסורים such as לפני עור and חניפה, etc may still apply.
אי"ה we'll
discuss how this applies to the case where someone is listening to another speak LH which is purely damage (e.g. is revealing the נידון's trade secret which will result in financial harm) without any דברי גנות.
Main Takeaways(1) The CC is not trying to say here that the איסור שמיעה per se depends on intention. Rather
any איסור in the Torah requires a certain intent.
(2) Nontheless, the CC is
מחדש that the איסור שמיעה
parallels איסור סיפור and thus itself includes one category which does depend on intention. The 2 types of LH (middah and damage) apply to both שמיעה/קבלה and סיפר. The middah LH is based on intention and damage LH is for creating the
possibility of harm or diminishing how one views the נידון - regardless of intent.
(3) The CC illustrates how intention (even if not לתועלת) can result in a היתר re: סיפור לשה"ר. It would seem the same applies to the איסור שמיעה וקבלה. Conversely, one needs להחליט בנפשו בהסכם גמור that what he is about to hear won't possibly result in damage/diminishment of his opinion.
May 5, 2026